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THE SCOTTISH INDEPENDENCE
REFERENDUM AND THE PRINCIPLES
OF DEMOCRATIC SECESSION
INTRODUCTION
dejected man, slumped with dozens of others in Glasgow’s
George Square was draped in a crumpled saltire, the flag
of Scotland.1 A couple in Edinburgh sobbed, each in matching
tartans.2 Across town, jubilant girls, each wearing bright pins
emblazoned with the word “No” hoisted the King’s Colours high.3
On September 18, 2014, Scots both celebrated and grieved, as
fifty-five percent of voters in Scotland’s independence referen-
dum chose not to secede from the United Kingdom.4 To many,
the outcome prevented the “huge economic, political and mili-
tary imponderables that would have flowed from a vote for inde-
pendence.”5
Secessions like the one recently sought by Scotland are indeed
a persistent problem for the international state system. Such se-
cessions threaten two of the central principles of the state sys-
tem: territorial integrity and sovereignty. 6 Yet international
law7 has remained largely silent on the matter of secession.8 De-
spite the fact that secessions occur, and some seceding states at-
tain legitimacy and recognition, the breadth of secessionary
1. Steven Erlanger & Alan Cowell, Scotland Rejects Independence from
Britain, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2014, at A1.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Serge Schmemann, A Peaceful Decision in Scotland, but Misery Else-
where, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2014, at SR2.
5. Erlanger & Cowell, supra note 1.
6. Glen Anderson, Secession in International Law and Relations: What Are
We Talking About?, 35 LOY. L.A. INT’L&COMP. L. REV. 343, 343 (2013).
7. The sources of international law include international treaties, custom-
ary international law, the general principles of law of civilized nations, and the
judicial decisions of highly qualified publicists. Rüdiger Wolfrum, Sources of
International Law, in THE MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW (R. Wolfrum ed., 2014). Customary international law con-
sists of the repeated behavior of states and the belief that such behavior de-
pends on a legal obligation. Tullio Treves, Customary International Law, in
THE MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (R. Wolfrum
ed., 2014).
8. Christopher Connolly, Independence in Europe: Secession, Sovereignty,
and the European Union, 24 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 51, 67 n.95 (2013).
A
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mechanisms and scenarios make a unified analysis of secession
difficult.9
While “secession” remains difficult to define, this Note will pro-
ceed from the broad definition advanced by Glen Anderson, who
posits that secession is “[t]he withdrawal of territory (colonial or
non-colonial) from part of an existing state to create a new
state.”10 Though secessions occur through a variety of mecha-
nisms, from negotiation to force,11 democratic secessions raise
some of the thorniest issues.12 Democratic secessions employ the
political form of the independence referendum, which is a “direct
vote by the electorate of a country” that decides group claims
concerning “the right to separate [secede] from the existing state
of which the group concerned is a part, and to set up a new inde-
pendent state.”13 By using the form of independence referen-
dums, within or outside the bounds of domestic constitutional
frameworks, 14 democratic secessions cannot be dismissed for
9. Anderson, supra note 6, at 343.
10. Id. Anderson notes that “[e]xactly what the concept of secession entails”
remains a matter of debate, and contrasts his own unified analysis with those
of other prominent secession scholars, such as James Crawford and Peter Ra-
dan (citing JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
(2006); PETER RADAN, CREATING NEW STATES: THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
SECESSION (2007)).
11. For a discussion of mechanisms of secession and the contexts in which
such mechanisms are deployed, see id. at 349–54. “Consensual” secessions oc-
cur with the consent of the parent country either by constitutional procedure
or political negotiation. Id. “Unilateral” secessions occur without the consent
of the parent country and may implicate the use of force. Id.
12. See Zoran Oklopcic, Independence Referendums and Democratic Theory
in Quebec and Montenegro, 18 NATIONALISM & ETHNIC POL. 22 (2012). Demo-
cratic secessions implicate questions about the proper electorate, requisite ma-
jority, new national boundaries, and permitted degree of external involvement.
13. Yves Beigbeder, Referendum, in THEMAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW ¶¶ 1, 5 (Rudiger Wolfrum ed., 2014).
14. Anderson, supra note 6, at 350–52 (citing independence referendums in
Quebec in 1995 and Montenegro in 2003 as examples of constitutional seces-
sion, and the 1905 Norwegian independence referendum as an example of a
politically negotiated secession).
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lack of legitimacy, as might secessions by force.15 Nor can demo-
cratic secessions be understood within the framework of decolo-
nization.16
In parent nations17 that espouse the principles of self-determi-
nation, democratic secession illustrates the inherent tension in
international law between permitting self-determination and
preserving sovereignty and territorial integrity.18 This tension is
evident in the case of the United Kingdom, which faced the pro-
spect of Scotland’s separation by independence referendum in
2014.19 Scotland joined Britain in 1707, secured a Scottish par-
liament through a devolution 20 referendum in 1997, and at-
tained a Nationalist Party majority in Scottish Parliament in
15. Glen Anderson, Unilateral Non-Colonial Secession and the Use of Force:
Effect on Claims to Statehood in International Law, 28 CONN. J. INT’L L. 197,
199, 216 (2013). The use of force in non-colonial secessions is a violation of
peremptory norms against the use of force, unless the right of self-determina-
tion is implicated by extreme human rights abuses. By contrast, using force in
a colonial secession is legal if the colony uses force to defend its pursuit of sov-
ereign independence.
16. Id. at 217 (citing Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colo-
nial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514, U.N. Doc. A/RES/1514 (Dec. 14,
1960)). Decolonization is unique because international law supports a custom-
ary right to colonial secession. This customary right is evinced by the United
Nations Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries
and Peoples in 1960, and various nonbinding instruments drafted thereafter.
See, e.g., Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of
the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2625 (Oct. 24, 1970); Def-
inition of Aggression, G. A. Res. 3314, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3314 (Dec. 14, 1974);
Declaration on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations,
G.A. Res. 50/6, U.N. Doc. A/RES/50/6 (Oct. 24, 1995)).
17. As used in this Note, the term parent refers to an existing, predecessor
state from which a territory aims to secede.
18. Peter Radan, Secessionist Referenda in International and Domestic Law,
18 NATIONALISM & ETHNIC POL. 8, 9 (2012). In international law, the central
issue concerning the legality of the independence referendum is “whether the
guarantee of the territorial integrity of states set out in Article 2(4) of the Char-
ter of the United Nations is absolute” or instead subject to the customary right
of peoples to self-determination (as illustrated by the United Nations General
Assembly Declaration on Friendly Relations). Id.
19. Erlanger & Cowell, supra note 1.
20. Glen Anderson proposes, “Devolution is the voluntary grant of certain
legislative powers to a lower level of government and without a transfer of sov-
ereignty.” Anderson, supra note 6, at 388.
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2011.21 Once the Nationalist Party attained a parliamentary
majority, it advocated for an independence referendum, and ul-
timately the governments of Scotland and the United Kingdom
agreed in 2012 that the Scots would vote on their independence
in two years.22 Polling a week before the independence referen-
dum of September 18, 2014 indicated that the secessionists, nar-
rowly behind the unionists in the polls, had gained momentum.23
In accordance with negotiations between the Scottish and Eng-
lish governments, the vote was poised to sever the United King-
dom.24
Scotland, the secessionary territory, was not across an ocean
from its parent, but directly within its borders.25 Independence
referendums occurring in contiguous states can physically divide
the parent state, threatening territorial integrity and sover-
eignty in a manner that the secession of former overseas colonies
did not.26 Yet, the U.K. government, though desperate to retain
Scotland and promising to further devolve government functions
to Scotland if it chose to remain in the union, would have re-
spected the referendum and worked to implement it if ap-
proved.27
The Scottish independence referendum thus indicates an im-
portant trajectory in international law. By further developing
referendums that preceded it, the Scottish independence refer-
endum has set forth an important precedent. Scotland was able
to decide, with international legal legitimacy, the historic matter
of its independence by (i) obtaining the consent of the parent
state to initiate an independence referendum, (ii) advancing a
21. Stephen Tierney, Legal Issues Surrounding the Referendum on Inde-
pendence for Scotland, 9 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 359, 360 (2013).
22. James Crawford,Opinion: Referendum on the Independence of Scotland–
International Law Aspects, Annex A to SCOTLAND OFFICE ET AL., SCOTLAND
ANALYSIS: DEVOLUTION AND THE IMPLICATIONS OF SCOTTISH INDEPENDENCE 69
para. 8, Cm. 8554 (2013), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/up-
loads/attachment_data/file/79417/Scotland_analysis_Devolution_and_the_im-
plications_of_Scottish_Independan...__1_.pdf.
23. Steven Erlanger, Britain Pledges More Self-Rule for Scots if They Reject
Scottish Independence, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 7, 2014, at A4.
24. Id.
25. Connolly notes that the secession of overseas colonies did not “threaten
the sovereignty or alter the borders of the parent state.” Connolly, supra note
8, at 71.
26. Id.
27. Erlanger & Cowell, supra note 1.
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direct and unambiguous question concerning independence on
the ballot, and (iii) deciding the matter on the basis of a simple
majority. These principles constitute meaningful precedent to
which subsequent secessionists must adhere.
This Note will examine the implications of Scotland’s inde-
pendence referendum by assessing the history of independence
referendums and the present scope of relevant international
law. Part I illustrates the historical development of independ-
ence referendums, from the first referendums at the outset of the
American Civil War to the independence referendums in the So-
viet Union and Yugoslavia. Part II analyzes the implications of
the 1995 independence referendum in Quebec. Part III situates
the Scottish independence referendum in the context of evolving
law and state practice, and suggests that Scotland held a prece-
dential independence referendum. Part IV describes how the
Scottish experience can ultimately serve as a powerful rubric for
future attempts at secession by independence referendum.
I. THEHISTORICALDEVELOPMENT OF INDEPENDENCE
REFERENDUMS
The independence referendum has developed over time, and
the Scottish independence referendum has consequently drawn
upon the principles of preceding independence referendums. Cu-
mulatively, these historic referendums set forth the require-
ments of formal legislative process, legal basis, majority ap-
proval, and standing. The following sections detail the growth of
these principles between two periods of conflict, the American
Civil War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union.
A. The First Independence Referendums — the Confederate
States, 1861
In the prelude to the American Civil War, the Confederate
states attempting to secede from the United States held the first
independence referendums.28 American states had historically
conducted referendums to decide different important matters of
governance and did so when the matter of secession arose.29 In-
deed, accustomed to the practice of referendums, the experience
28. Matt Qvortrup, Referendums on Independence, 1860–2011, 85 POL. Q.
57, 57 (2014).
29. Matt Qvortrup, The History of Ethno-National Referendums 1791–2011,
18 NATIONALISM&ETHNICPOL. 129, 135 (2012). Qvortrup notes that the history
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of the seceding Confederate states illustrates important aspects
of the independence referendum. Each of the independence ref-
erendums relied upon formal legislative process, legal basis, and
required the approval of withdrawal from the United States by
a strong majority.
1. Texas
In November 1860, Texans faced the election of Abraham Lin-
coln, who was perceived to threaten the institution of slavery.30
Many in Texas, a state where slavery was legal and considered
central to the state’s economy and growth, became inspired by
South Carolina, which responded to Lincoln’s election by calling
a secession convention and declaring secession from the United
States in December 1860. After the calling of secession conven-
tions in five other slaveholding and cotton-growing southern
states, secessionists in Texas agitated for their state to secede
from the United States.31 Texas secessionists increasingly pres-
sured their legislature for a secession convention and vowed to
do so in opposition to Governor Houston, who refused to call a
special session of the legislature to approve a secession conven-
tion in 1861.32 The governor relented, and the legislature ap-
proved a convention.33 The convention approved secession but
included a referendum provision.34 Governor Houston and Un-
ionists advocated for the referendum provided for in the seces-
sion convention, thinking it necessary to clearly resolve the issue
of secession from the United States.35 The Ordinance of Seces-
sion required a simple majority to “repeal[] and annul[]” the
state’s ratification of the U.S. Constitution on the grounds that
of referendums on other matters related to sovereignty, including unification
of territories or integration into other states, precedes the American Civil War.
Id.
30. Ralph A. Wooster, Civil War, HANDBOOK OF TEX. ONLINE,
https://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/qdc02 (last updated Dec.
3, 2015).
31. Id.
32. Walter L. Buenger, Secession, HANDBOOK OF TEX. ONLINE,
http://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/mgs02 (last updated Mar.
8, 2011).
33. Id.
34. Walter L. Buenger, Secession Convention, HANDBOOK OF TEX. ONLINE,
http://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/mjs01 (last updated Mar.
8, 2011).
35. Id.
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the actions of the northern states and the federal government
were “violative of the compact between the states and the guar-
antees of the Constitution.”36 The voters of Texas approved the
Ordinance on February 23, 1861.37
2. Virginia
That same month, Virginia’s legislature approved a secession
convention and determined that any Ordinance of Secession
would need to be submitted to the people of Virginia in the form
of a referendum.38 The first referendum was forestalled, and the
second failed by a margin of two to one.39 The intervening attack
on Fort Sumter40 precipitated a third vote, which approved se-
cession by four to one.41 Virginia reserved the right to secede in
its ratification of the Virginia constitution and invoked this right
in its Ordinance of Secession, asking a simple majority of voters
to “repeal[] and abrogate[]” the convention that ratified the U.S.
Constitution in 1788.42 Unionists in West Virginia then seceded
from Virginia, and applied for and received admittance to the
Union.43 When Virginia was readmitted to the Union, it explic-
itly surrendered the right of secession.44
36. An Ordinance to Dissolve the Union Between the State of Texas and the
Other States in a Compact Styled “The Constitution of the United States of
America,” Feb. 2, 1861 (Tex.), reprinted in ORDINANCES OF SECESSION AND
OTHERDOCUMENTS, 1860–1861 (A. B. Hart & E. Channing eds., 1893).
37. Wooster, supra note 30.
38. Nelson D. Lankford, Virginia Convention of 1861, ENCYCLOPEDIA VA.
(June 20, 2014), http://www.EncyclopediaVirginia.org/Virginia_Constitu-
tional_Convention_of_1861.
39. Id.
40. Fort Sumter, in the harbor of Charleston, South Carolina, remained one
of the last southern federal garrisons after the secession of South Carolina,
Mississippi, Florida, Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, and Texas. The Confeder-
ate bombardment of Fort Sumter on April 12, 1861, led President Lincoln to
call for volunteers to suppress the Confederate rebellion. Id.
41. Id.
42. An Ordinance to Repeal the Ratification of the Constitution of the United
States of America, by the State of Virginia, and to Resume All the Rights and
Powers Granted Under Said Constitution, Apr. 17, 1861 (Va.), reprinted in
ORDINANCES OF SECESSION ANDOTHERDOCUMENTS, 1860–1861 (A. B. Hart & E.
Channing eds., 1893); VA. CONST. of 1851, BILL OF RIGHTS arts. 2, 3.
43. RICHARD OWENS, ROGUE STATE: THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS OF
ESTABLISHINGWEST VIRGINIA STATEHOOD 44 (2013).
44. The Virginia Constitution of 1851, in force prior to Virginia’s secession,
provided that a “majority of the community hath an indubitable, inalienable,
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3. Tennessee
The citizens of Tennessee voted to hold a secession convention
in February 1861 and then rejected the measure in a close vote.45
The events of Fort Sumter led the governor to call a secret ses-
sion of the legislature that voted to secede from the Union, sub-
ject to approval by the voters of Tennessee in a referendum on
secession.46 The Tennessee Ordinance of Secession “waiv[ed] an
expression of opinion as to the abstract doctrine of secession” but
“assert[ed] the right as a free and independent people, to alter,
reform, or abolish our form of government,” asking voters to “ab-
rogate[] and annul[]” the “laws and ordinances by which the
State of Tennessee became a member of the . . . Union.”47 As in
the case of Virginia, strong Unionist sentiment persisted in east-
ern Tennessee after the referendum, where voters had rejected
the Ordinance of Secession.48
4. The Impact of the Confederate Independence Referendums
The legality of the Confederate secessions by independence
referendum was adjudicated in Texas v. White by the U.S. Su-
preme Court.49 Texas v. White is understood to stand for the
proposition that the unilateral secessions, including those by ref-
and indefeasible right to reform, alter, or abolish” the government. VA. CONST.
of 1851, art. I, § 3. However, the Virginia Constitution of 1870 was ratified as
a condition of readmission pursuant to the Reconstruction Acts, which required
the Confederate States to ratify a constitution “in conformity with the Consti-
tution of the United States in all respects.” 14 Stat. 428 (1867). This revised
state constitution expressly set forth that “all attempts . . . to dissolve [the]
Union or to sever [the] nation, are unauthorized and ought to be resisted with
the whole power of the state.” VA. CONST. of 1870, art. I, § 2.
45. Derek W. Frisby, The Vortex of Secession: West Tennesseans and the
Rush to War, in SISTER STATES, ENEMY STATES: THE CIVIL WAR IN KENTUCKY
AND TENNESSEE 47, 53 (Kent Dollar et al. eds., 2011).
46. Id. at 61.
47. May 7, 1861 Declaration of Independence and Ordinance Dissolving the
Federal Relations Between the State of Tennessee and the United States of
America, republished in AM. HIST. LEAFLETS: COLONIAL&CONST., Nov. 1893, at
19–20.
48. Robert Tracy McKenzie, An Unconditional, Straight-out Union Man:
Parson Brownlow and the Secession Crisis in East Tennessee, in SISTERSTATES,
ENEMYSTATES: THECIVILWAR INKENTUCKYANDTENNESSEE 72, 76 (Kent Dollar
et al. eds., 2011).
49. Texas v. White, 4 U.S. 700 (1868).
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erendum, were illegal, yet some scholars assert that those seces-
sions occurring with the consent of the populace in the form of a
referendum might be legal.50 Peter Radan, analyzing the legal
reasoning underlying Texas v. White, argued that it “does not
support the proposition that unilateral secession from the
United States is illegal and unconstitutional.”51 Texas v. White,
Radan notes, contemplates secession by consent.52 In such a sce-
nario, a national independence referendum on independence
could arguably command legitimacy and result in legal seces-
sion.53
Though the Confederate secessions were ultimately found ille-
gal, they established important points of reference for future in-
dependence referendums. Each of the Confederate independence
referendums proceeded through a formal legislative process, in-
voked a legal ground for holding a referendum, formulated a
question to the voters, and commanded strong majorities for se-
cession. Although the independence referendums after the
American Civil War occurred for different reasons that included
demands for foreign affairs powers, economic control, and na-
tional sovereignty, these principles would figure in the inde-
pendence referendums that followed.
B. Independence Referendums After the American Civil War,
1905-1944
While the period of American Civil War established important
requirements for independence referendums, the subsequent pe-
riod refined the process and illustrated the increased importance
of the principle of standing. The following sections will conse-
quently discuss and analyze the independence referendums held
between the American Civil War and World War II.
50. Peter Radan, Secessionist Referenda in International and Domestic Law,
18 NATIONALISM&ETHNIC POL. 8, 18 (2012). Glen Anderson notes, contrary to
Radan and Akhil Amar, thatWhite is typically understood to preclude the con-
stitutionality of secession. Anderson, supra note 6, at 351 (citing Akhil Reed
Amar, The David C. Baum Lecture: Abraham Lincoln and the American Union,
2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 1109, 1115 (2001).
51. Peter Radan, ‘An Indestructible Union of Indestructible States’: The Su-
preme Court of the United States and Secession, 10 LEGALHIST. 187, 201 (2006).
52. Id. at 194–95.
53. Id.
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1. Norway
The next independence referendum followed Norway’s efforts
to secede from Sweden.54 In 1814, the Kingdom of Norway at-
tempted to secure complete sovereignty after being ceded to Swe-
den by Denmark, yet ultimately accepted a joint monarch and
diplomatic service with Sweden. 55 Conflicts between Norway
and Sweden arose throughout the 1890s, and when Norway
sought and failed to attain sovereign foreign affairs powers coe-
qual with Sweden’s in 1905, the Norwegian ministers resigned
their positions.56 Norway’s legislature then seceded from Swe-
den unilaterally in 1905 in protest of the King’s failure to recon-
stitute the government.57 Though the Swedish legislature de-
cried the move as illegal, it approved conditions for the dissolu-
tion of the union that included a referendum and ongoing nego-
tiations as to the implementation of Norway’s independence.58
The referendum asked Norwegians if they “agree[d] to the dis-
solution that has taken place.”59 The Norwegian electorate ap-
proved independence in its referendum and negotiated the nec-
essary requirements.60 The overwhelming approval was a relief
to Norway, which had undertaken a massive campaign to attain
a “Yes” majority.61
2. Western Australia
During the same period, Western Australia, a mineral-rich re-
gion within the British colony of Australia, declined to affirm a
Commonwealth Constitution in referendums held in 1898 and
1899 that would create a largely independent Australian Feder-
ation.62 Ultimately, after the bill was ratified in the Imperial
54. Qvortrup, supra note 28, at 57.
55. Øystein Sørensen, 1905–A Peaceful Separation, NORWAY, SWED. &
UNION, http://www.nb.no/baser/1905/tema_soren_e.html (last visited Jan. 16,
2016).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Circular of Instructions from the Department of Justice to the Registra-
tion Officers and Board of Education, July 29, 1905, in SARAH WAMBAUGH, A
MONOGRAPH ON PLEBISCITES: WITH A COLLECTION OF OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS
(1920).
60. Sørensen, supra note 55.
61. The Referendums in 1905, NORWAY, SWEDEN & UNION,
http://www.nb.no/baser/1905/tema_folk_e.html (last visited Dec. 29, 2015).
62. Qvortrup, supra note 29, at 138, 141.
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Parliament of the United Kingdom, the voters of Western Aus-
tralia approved the bill.63 Australian politicians, spurred by the
American example felt the need to win the support of Western
Australia’s population.64 In 1906, frustrated with its inability to
set its own customs and tariff policy, the Legislature of Western
Australia drafted legislation that called for a referendum on
withdrawing from the Australian Federation.65
By the late 1930s, with the onset of the Great Depression and
continued high tariff policies, support for Western Australia’s
secession from the Australian Federation had surged.66 Pursu-
ant to acts of the Western Australian legislature, a referendum
asked voters if they were “in favour of the State of Western Aus-
tralia withdrawing from the federal Commonwealth established
under the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act (Impe-
rial)?”67 When the voters approved the referendum two to one,
the secessionists had to decide whether to attempt to secede uni-
laterally, seek internal amendment of the Australian constitu-
tion, or petition the Imperial Parliament to amend the Common-
wealth of Australia Constitution Act to permit Western Aus-
tralia’s secession.68
In turn, the newly elected Premier struggled with the tension
between the new Federation of Australia and his party’s dedica-
tion to the principles of referendums.69 Yet, he vowed to give the
referendum effect, and the secessionists made a petition to the
Imperial Parliament of the British Empire. 70 When Western
Australia chose this latter option, the Imperial Parliament de-
clined to recognize the Western Australian delegation’s stand-
ing, and dismissed the petition.71
The Imperial Parliament refused to accept the petition for a
lack of standing.72 The Joint Select Committee, comprised of
members from the House of Lords and the House of Commons,
63. Id. at 138.
64. Id. at 137.
65. Thomas Musgrave, The Western Australian Secessionist Movement, 3
MACQUARIE L.J. 95, 100 (2003).
66. Id. at 105.
67. Id. at 106.
68. Id. at 107.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 107, 108.
71. Id. at 122.
72. Id.
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refused the petition because the parliament of Western Aus-
tralia submitted its petition as a substate actor.73 Only the Com-
monwealth of Australia could submit the petition, and because
it had not, the Imperial Parliament refused to give the petition
effect.74
3. Iceland
Few independence referendums immediately followed West-
ern Australia’s in 1933.75 Fifty independence referendums oc-
curred betweenWestern Australia’s and Scotland’s, but only one
occurred between 1933 and the Second World War.76 Iceland se-
ceded from Denmark at the height of the Second World War on
entirely different terms than did Western Australia.
Icelandic nationalists had been agitating for increased sover-
eignty from Denmark since 1848, and accomplished a revival of
their legislature, the Althing, in 1874.77 Demands for secession
escalated in 1913, when Denmark confiscated an Icelandic flag
in Reykjavik’s harbor.78 These demands resulted in Denmark
forming the Danish Committee, which “enacted a new Union
treaty which established an independent state with the Danish
monarch at its head.”79 Consequently, unlike the formerly colo-
nial Western Australia, which entered the Australian Federa-
tion as a colonial territory, but similar to Norway, which had
sovereignty over domestic affairs when it held its referendum,
Iceland had domestic sovereignty when it held a 1918 referen-
dum approving the Act of Union that joined the kingdoms of Ice-
land and Denmark.80 This Act of Union provided for review and
revision in 1940, and revocation three years thereafter if both
parties could not agree on renewing the Act of Union.81 When
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Qvortrup, supra note 28, at 58.
76. Id.
77. CREATINGNEW STATES: THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SECESSION 39–40 (Ale-
ksandar Pavkovic & Peter Radan eds., 2013).
78. Id.
79. Aleksandar Pavkovic, Peaceful Secessions: Norway, Iceland and Slo-
vakia, in CREATINGNEW STATES: THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SECESSION 515, 516
(Aleksandar Pavkovic & Peter Radan eds., 2013).
80. Robert Young,How Do Peaceful Secessions Happen?, 27 CAN. J. POL. SCI.
773, 788 (1994).
81. Ágúst Þór Árnason, Colonial Past and Constitutional Momentum: The
Case of Iceland, 8 ICE. E-JOURNALNORDIC&MEDITERRANEANSTUD., no. 2, 2013,
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Iceland terminated the Act of Union in 1940, the constitutional
secession process remarkably proceeded without incident, de-
spite the occupation of Denmark, and Icelandic voters over-
whelmingly approved independence.82
4. Early Twentieth Century Independence Referendums and
the Issue of Standing
The early twentieth century independence referendums both
applied and developed the principles of the Confederate inde-
pendence referendums by proceeding through legislative or par-
liamentary measures, posing direct questions, and achieving sig-
nificant majorities. However, these subsequent independence
referendums illustrate an additional aspect of the process. Nor-
way and Iceland achieved secession because they initially en-
tered accords with their parent states as complete sovereigns,
and were thus better positioned to constitutionally reclaim such
sovereignty later by independence referendum.83 Western Aus-
tralia, by contrast, was a federal state within a former colony,
and lacked the standing required to negotiate the implementa-
tion of its independence referendum with the United Kingdom.84
Thus, the secessions of Norway, Western Australia, and Iceland
illustrate the importance of legal standing to call an independ-
ence referendum and negotiate its implementation.
C. Independence Referendums in the Postwar Period
Some independence referendums after the Second World War
occurred during conflict, some during the dissolution of states,
and many implicated concerns for a fair and free electorate.85 By
at 1, 3–4, http://nome.unak.is/nm-marzo-2012/vol-8-no-2-2013/58-conference-
paper/425-colonial-past-and-constitutional-momentum-the-case-of-ice-
land?tmpl=component&format=pdf.
82. Young, supra note 80, at 788.
83. Id. at 787–88.
84. Musgrave, supra note 65, at 122.
85. Matt Qvortrup, New Development: The Comparative Study of Secession
Referendums, 34 PUB. MONEY &MGMT. 153, 156 (2014). Many of the postwar
independence referendums occurred during the breakup of the Soviet Union
and the Balkans conflict. The majority of independence referendums occur in
nondemocratic countries, which “might explain the high success rate.” Id.
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at least one scholar’s measure, only one independence referen-
dum in a democratic state has resulted in secession, in Monte-
negro in 2006.86
In the postwar period, secessionists held thirteen independ-
ence referendums across the world, which were employed in a
number of contexts. 87 Though the majority of colonies that
achieved independence in the postwar period did not submit the
matter to the electorate, the breakup of several colonies was
achieved by independence referendum. 88 The collapse of the
French Empire provides an example. In 1958, eleven colonies
voted to retain ties with France, while only one, Guinea, rejected
the proposition and consequently gained its independence.89
Apart from these French referendums, however, independence
referendums in the context of decolonization remained relatively
rare. 90 Though these early referendums occurred in contexts
that included decolonization, it is “difficult to find a general pat-
tern of when referendums were held after the Second World
War.”91
Despite the absence of such a general pattern, these postwar
referendums cumulatively developed the principles and form of
the modern independence referendum. 92 Each referendum
struggled for legitimacy and grappled with difficult procedural
questions about enfranchisement, the referendum question, and
the required majority.93 Ultimately, by the time the Soviet Un-
ion fell, “independence referendums became something ap-
proaching an international norm before secession could take
86. Id.
87. Id. at 154.
88. Qvortrup, supra note 28, at 58.
89. Id. Qvortrup notes that while Guinea, under the leadership of the na-
tionalist Ahmed Sékou Touré, rejected association with France, the eleven
states that voted to remain in Charles de Gaulle’s Communauté francaise all
became independent states within two years. Id. None of these states held in-
dependence referendums. Id.
90. Qvortrup, supra note 29, at 145.
91. Qvortrup, supra note 28, at 59.
92. Id. at 63–64. Despite the variety of historical contexts, independence
referendums continued to implicate the same issues and trends in procedural
and legal approaches to referendums.
93. Id.
2015] Scottish Independence Referendum 387
place.”94 Indeed, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the ma-
jority of new emerging states held independence referendums.95
These included countries seceding from Communist rule, but
also countries unable to hold referendums because the United
States and the Soviet Union exerted influence over their domes-
tic governance.96
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, independence referen-
dums were held at an unprecedented rate. 97 Former Soviet
States voted on their independence, and the resultant new states
in turn faced independence referendums from substate sepa-
ratists.98 At the same time, a handful of voters in western de-
mocracies conducted independence referendums, including
those in Quebec.99
II. QUEBEC AND THEMODERN INDEPENDENCE REFERENDUM
Building upon the independence referendums that preceded it,
the 1995 independence referendum in Quebec constitutes a crit-
ical precedent, which directly influenced and framed the Scot-
tish independence referendum. The following sections will dis-
cuss the 1995 independence referendum, the subsequent adjudi-
cation of the referendum by the Supreme Court of Canada, sub-
sequent legislation concerning the referendum, and the applica-
tion of the Quebec precedent in the modern era.
94. Id. at 60.
95. STEPHEN TIERNEY, THE REFERENDUM IN MULTI-LEVEL STATES:
FRACTURING OR FOSTERING FEDERALMODELS OFGOVERNMENT? 5 (2014).
96. Qvortrup, supra note 29, at 147. East Timor was able to hold an inde-
pendence referendum in 1999, only after the end of the Cold War. Id. The
United States had previously supported the incumbent Suharto regime against
the Soviet Union. Id.
97. Qvortrup, supra note 85, 154. The majority of postwar independence ref-
erendums occurred after the fall of the Soviet Union, driven in part by the dis-
solution of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Id.
98. Id. For example, Georgia seceded from the Soviet Union after a referen-
dum in 1991 only to face subsequent independence referendums from South
Ossetia and Abkhazia thereafter.
99. Id. at 155. Other than Quebec, the island of Nevis in the state of St. Kitts
and Nevis attempted secession by referendum pursuant to constitutional pro-
vision in 1998, and Montenegro achieved secession from the state of Serbia by
independence referendum in 2005. See discussion infra Part II.D.
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A. The Referendums
The 1995 independence referendum in Quebec was a critical
event in the development of international law on secession and
referendums.100 Before the 1995 referendum, however, Quebec
first attempted near independence in 1980 with a referendum on
whether Quebec should attain sovereignty while retaining some
economic association with Canada.101Under such an agreement,
Quebec, “though nominally independent, would retain some
form of political and economic partnership with the rest of Can-
ada.”102
The 1980 referendum was defeated, and Quebec put full inde-
pendence to a vote in 1995.103 The 1995 referendum failed by an
exceedingly small margin.104 Though the referendum narrowly
failed, debates persisted throughout the secession campaign as
to the required majority to approve independence.105 Further,
the wording of the exact question was a matter of disagree-
ment.106 Thereafter, Canada would address these disputes about
Quebec’s referendums through adjudication in the Supreme
Court, the case of the Secession Reference (“Secession Refer-
ence”), and legislation in Parliament, the “Clarity Act.”
B. Secession Reference
In the wake of the secessionists’ narrow loss in 1995, a host of
domestic legislative and judicial law considered and refined the
principles of the independence referendum.107 The constitution-
ality of the referendum and its comportment with international
100. Radan, supra note 50, at 16.
101. Beigbeder, supra note 13, ¶ 43.
102. Christopher K. Connolly, Scottish Independence Insta-Symposium: “De-
volution Max” and the Question of Referendum Questions, OPINIO JURIS (Sept.
17, 2014, 3:30 PM), http://opiniojuris.org/2014/09/17/scottish-independence-in-
sta-symposium-devolution-max-question-referendum-questions.
103. Id.
104. Beigbeder, supra note 13, ¶ 43.
105. Oklopcic, supra note 112, at 26–27.
106. Peter Lynch, Scottish Independence, The Quebec Model of Secession and
the Political Future of the Scottish National Party, 11 NATIONALISM& ETHNIC
POL. 503, 507 (2005). The 1995 referendum asked whether Quebec should be-
come sovereign after “a formal offer to Canada for a new economic and political
partnership,” in part due to nationalist requests for a compromise question. Id.
(citing Jean Crête, The Quebec 1995 Constitutional Referendum, 6 REGIONAL&
FED. STUD., no. 3, 1996, at 81).
107. Id.
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law was adjudicated by Supreme Court of Canada in Reference
re Secession of Quebec.108 This important decision represents
the first meaningful adjudication of an independence referen-
dum and attempted secession since Texas v. White.109
The Court held that Quebec had no unilateral right of seces-
sion under international law, but also concluded that interna-
tional law did not expressly preclude such a right.110 Secession
implicates the principle of territorial integrity, enshrined in the
Charter of the United Nations.111 However, the Court noted that
in the absence of a specific prohibition of secession, the principle
of self-determination, evidenced by the Charter of the United
Nations and affirmed by the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, and other international instru-
ments, requires that people are entitled to pursue political, eco-
nomic, and social development.112
While the principle of self-determination is typically recog-
nized through internal self-determination, pursued “within the
framework of an existing state,” external self-determination, or
a unilateral right to secession, could be available under specific,
delineated circumstances that did not apply to Quebec.113 Under
the Secession Reference, unilateral “secession is only authorized
in exceptional circumstances, namely where a community
within a State is subject to oppression.”114 Absent such circum-
stances, a clear referendum result alone has no legal effect, nor
can it displace the rule of law or the principles of federalism.115
The Canadian Supreme Court recognized that this principle re-
quires secessionists to negotiate both the act of secession and the
terms of such secession with the federal government.116
108. Reference re Secession of Quebec [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (Can.).
109. See supra Part I.A.4.
110. Beigbeder, supra note 13, ¶ 43.
111. [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, 278 (Can.); U.N. Charter art. 2(4).
112. [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, 278–80 (Can.) (citing International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI) (Dec. 16, 1966); International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI)
(Dec. 16, 1966); and Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation
in Europe, 14 I.L.M. 1292 (1975)).
113. Tierney, supra note 21, at 375.
114. Id.
115. [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, 221 (Can.).
116. Id.
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Thus, the Court held that secession could be possible only if
“facilitated by a negotiated constitutional amendment.”117 An
amendment was required, because secession could only be ef-
fected by respecting the rights and interests of Canadians out-
side of Quebec in the Canadian Constitution.118 Such an amend-
ment would have to begin with “a clear expression of the people
of Quebec of their will to secede from Canada” in the form of an
independence referendum.119
Though the secessionists asserted that a simple majority could
approve an independence referendum, the Court’s opinion is in-
terpreted to require more than a simple majority.120 However,
the Secession Reference did not fully establish what constituted
a “clear expression” with regards to the referendum question or
the specifically required majority.121 The ambiguous majority re-
quirement and unclear referendum question are often identified
as reasons why the margin of loss on the 1995 vote was so nar-
row.122 These issues were then legislated to provide greater guid-
ance on the matter.
C. Clarity Act of 2000
The Parliament of Canada responded with a definitive state-
ment on the issues posed by the independence referendum to
foreclose further debate.123 It passed the Clarity Act, which set
forth a procedure for evaluating referendum questions.124 The
House of Commons was tasked with determining whether any
referendum majority constituted a “clear” majority for purposes
of the Secession Reference.125 “Majority” is assessed based on
several factors, including the size of the majority and the num-
ber of eligible voters.126 Critically, the Clarity Act precluded any
proposals on sovereignty and association, requiring “a referen-
dum that sets forth a stark choice between either full separation
117. Radan, supra note 50, at 16.
118. [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, 221 (Can.).
119. Id. at 221.
120. Radan, supra note 50, at 17.
121. Connolly, supra note 8, at 74.
122. Id. at 75.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Clarity Act, R.S.C. 2000, c. 26 (Can.).
126. Id.
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or continued inclusion in the Canadian state.”127 In response, the
National Assembly of Quebec passed legislation, “Bill 99,” a re-
buke and alternative to the Clarity Act that reasserted the right
of the people of Quebec to express their political will on their own
terms.128
Because the Clarity Act was passed to apply the Supreme
Court’s holding in the Secession Reference, it represents an en-
actment of Canada’s judicial assessment of independence refer-
endums under the international legal principles of territorial in-
tegrity and self-determination evinced by the Charter of the
United Nations and the International Covenant on Civil and Po-
litical Rights. The Clarity Act also represents an assessment of
the process and requirements of independence referendums,
providing a potential model for future independence referen-
dums.129
D. Application of Quebec Referendum Principles in the Modern
Referendum
In the new millennium, the European Union applied the prin-
ciples of the Secession Reference when the European Commis-
sion for Democracy through Law advised Montenegro on its ref-
erendum on independence from Serbia. 130 The Constitution
Charter of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro explicitly
provided for secession after approval by independence referen-
dum.131 However, the Commission for Democracy through Law
127. Connolly, supra note 8, at 74.
128. An Act Respecting the Exercise of the Fundamental Rights and Prerog-
atives of the Québec People and the Québec State, R.S.Q. 2000, c. E-20.2 (Can.).
129. See Lynch, supra note 106. Lynch, writing in advance of the Scottish
independence referendum, recognized that certain principles of the independ-
ence referendum process used in Quebec could apply to Scotland, though he
ultimately argued that political and constitutional constraints prevent its ap-
plication in Scotland. Id.
130. Oklopcic, supra note 12, at 24–25. (“The Canadian Supreme Court’s rul-
ing in the Secession Reference was used in the Montenegrin context by the
European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) to ar-
gue that Montenegro’s referendum must feature ‘a clear question’ and yield ‘a
clear majority’ in favor of secession.”) For a discussion of the Venice Commis-
sion’s opinion on the compatibility of the existing legislation in Montenegro
concerning the organization of referendums with applicable international
standards, see Karsten Friis, The Referendum in Montenegro: The EU’s ‘Post-
modern Diplomacy’, 12 EUR. FOREIGNAFF. REV. 67, sec. V (2007).
131. Radan, supra note 50, at 16.
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proposed the enfranchisement and majority requirements that
ultimately structured the referendum.132 Only Montenegrin-res-
ident citizens could vote, more than half of the eligible electorate
had to vote, and over 55 percent of the voting electorate had to
approve the referendum.133 Thus, Montenegro engaged with the
issue of the “clear majority” requirement that the Secession Ref-
erence left ambiguous, concluding that a special-majority re-
quirement was required by the circumstances.134 Montenegro’s
achievement of independence shows the successful application
of the lessons learned from Quebec and signaled that interna-
tional law had begun to consider possible frameworks for seces-
sion by independence referendum.135
III. SCOTLAND’S INDEPENDENCE REFERENDUM ANDNEW
PRECEDENT
The governments of the United Kingdom and Scotland further
refined the principles of the independence referendum. Long ag-
itating for autonomy and independence from the United King-
dom, the Scottish National Party helped secure their autonomy,
in part, with a 1998 referendum on the devolution of power to
Scotland.136 The referendum on devolution victory led to the pas-
sage of the Scotland Act and the establishment of Scottish Par-
liament.137 In 2011, the Scottish National Party attained a com-
manding majority of the Scottish Parliament, and thereafter its
132. Oklopcic, supra note 12, at 27.
133. Id.
134. Qvortrup, supra note 28, at 61. Though special majority requirements
are often employed towards obstructionist aims, they have been used in limited
circumstances in a constitutional context. The federation of St. Kitts and Nevis
provided for secession on approval by two-thirds of the eligible electorate; how-
ever, a 1998 referendum failed to obtain the necessary special majority. Id.
135. Radan, supra note 50, at 15–16. Quebec and Montenegro provide differ-
ent constitutional examples of an implicit and explicit right to secession, re-
spectively.
136. Connolly, supra note 8, at 61.
137. See Scotland Act, 1998, c. 46 (U.K.). In a referendum held on September
9, 1998, 74 percent of voters approved a Scottish Parliament and the reserva-
tion of basic income tax determinations to the Parliament of England. Cabinet
Office & Scotland Office, Devolution Settlement: Scotland, GOV.UK (Feb. 20,
2013), https://www.gov.uk/guidance/devolution-settlement-scotland.
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leader and the First Minister of Scotland, Alex Salmond, pro-
claimed there would be a referendum on independence from the
United Kingdom.138
Despite its stated opposition, the United Kingdom reached an
agreement to hold a fair, decisive, legal, legitimate, and respect-
able referendum (the “Edinburgh Agreement”).139 The two gov-
ernments were able to agree to the broad principles of the inde-
pendence referendum,140 and the Scottish Parliament dutifully
legislated a detailed, exhaustively considered process by which
it could practicably, legally, and legitimately sever its centuries-
long ties with the United Kingdom.141
A. Consent and the Edinburgh Agreement
The Scottish independence referendum was preceded by his-
toric negotiations between the U.K. and Scottish governments,
resulting in the consent of the United Kingdom to a referendum
and an agreement on the principles of the referendum. The fol-
lowing section will analyze the devolution of powers to Scotland
that ultimately enabled negotiations between Scotland and the
United Kingdom, as well as the agreement that followed there-
after.
1. Scottish Devolution
Scotland was able to secure an agreement with the United
Kingdom to hold an independence referendum and implement
its result in part because the United Kingdom had devolved cer-
138. Salmond Calls for Independence Referendum in 2014, BBC (Jan. 10,
2012, 10:14PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-16478121.
139. Agreement Between the United Kingdom Government and the Scottish
Government on a Referendum on Independence for Scotland, SCOTTISH GOV’T
(Oct. 15, 2012) [hereinafter Edinburgh Agreement], http://www.scot-
land.gov.uk/About/Government/concordats/Referendum-on-independence.
140. The Edinburgh Agreement provided the following:
The governments are agreed that the referendum should: have a clear
legal base; be legislated for by the Scottish Parliament; be conducted
so as to command the confidence of parliaments, governments and
people; deliver a fair test and a decisive expression of the views of peo-
ple in Scotland and a result that everyone will respect.
Id.
141. Scottish Independence Referendum Act 2013, (ASP 14).
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tain governmental functions to the Scottish government that en-
abled Scotland to later push for secession.142 The 1997 referen-
dum on devolution established the Scottish Parliament and the
position of First Minister.143
When the Scottish National Party took control of the Scottish
Parliament in 2011, Scottish Parliament initially considered
passing legislation for the independence referendum.144 The le-
gality of such legislation was debated, but ultimately the pres-
sure exerted by Scottish Parliament resulted in negotiations and
eventual agreement between Scotland and England.145 Devolu-
tion, while recognized to lower “the institutional barriers to in-
dependence,” was also feared to create legislative obstacles to
attaining full independence.146 Yet Scotland, uniquely, was able
to engage the U.K. government and obtain its consent to a dis-
positive independence referendum.147
2. The Edinburgh Agreement
The U.K. and Scottish governments reached a historic accord,
the Edinburgh Agreement on October 15, 2012.148 The Edin-
burgh Agreement established the basic parameters for the inde-
pendence referendum, requiring the referendum to have Scot-
tish implementing legislation, a clear legal base, legitimate pro-
cedures, and to “deliver a fair test” and “decisive expression”
that would be respected legally and politically.149 An important
facet of the Edinburgh Agreement was the explicit devolution of
authority by the United Kingdom to Scotland to legislate an in-
dependence referendum, resolving the dispute over whether
such legislation properly fell under the ambit of the Scotland
Act.150
142. See Lynch, supra note 106, at 514 (noting that devolution conferred both
advantages and systematic constraints on Scottish Nationalists seeking inde-
pendence through referendum).
143. Scotland Act 1998, c.46, §§ 1, 45 (UK).
144. Tierney, supra note 21, at 360.
145. Id. at 361–62.
146. See Lynch, supra note 106, at 504–05.
147. Christopher Borgen, Will There be a Scottish Precedent?, OPINIO JURIS
(Sept. 18, 2014, 3:58 AM), http://opiniojuris.org/2014/09/18/will-scottish-prece-
dent.
148. Edinburgh Agreement, supra note 139.
149. Id.
150. Id.
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The consent of the U.K. government to the Scottish independ-
ence referendum showed a “level of acquiescence which is . . .
unprecedented” in the EU.151 Scotland’s independence could not
comport with international law if it was unilateral in charac-
ter.152 Indeed, James Crawford, writing a legal opinion at the re-
quest of the United Kingdom, concluded that the only legal basis
for Scotland’s separation would be the consent of the United
Kingdom.153 The commitment of the United Kingdom to honor
and implement the results of the referendum suggested that an
approval of independence would facilitate a transition to inde-
pendence, international recognition, and membership in the
United Nations.154 Because parent states are the principal objec-
tors to attempted secessions by independence referendums, the
consent of the United Kingdom obviated the debate about the
legality of Scotland’s secession under international law and
could have assisted Scotland in attaining international recogni-
tion.155
If Scotland failed to obtain the consent of the United Kingdom
before the independence referendum, it may have ultimately
failed to obtain recognition by the international community and
membership in international organizations, even subsequent to
a successful independence referendum. 156 Though Scotland
would meet the customary criteria for conferring recognition on
a state,157 which is not constitutive of statehood,158 in such a sce-
151. Tierney, supra note 21, at 360.
152. Connolly, supra note 8, at 77.
153. Crawford, supra note 22, at 67, paras. 1 & 22.3. Crawford concludes that
the principle of self-determination as delineated in the Secession Reference
does not confer a right to secede on Scotland, as it is a non-colonial state. Id.
154. Stephen Tierney, Scottish Independence Insta-Symposium: ‘Negotiated
Independence’–Scottish Independence and a New Path to Statehood?, OPINIO
JURIS (Sept. 16, 2014, 9:00 AM), http://opiniojuris.org/2014/09/16/scottish-inde-
pendence-insta-symposium-negotiated-independence-scottish-independence-
new-path-statehood.
155. Tierney, supra note 21, at 378; Milena Sterio, International Law Should
Matter–Thoughts on the Proposed Scottish Secession, OPINIO JURIS (Sept. 17,
2014, 10:30 AM), http://opiniojuris.org/2014/09/17/scottish-independence-in-
sta-symposium-international-law-matter-thoughts-proposed-scottish-seces-
sion.
156. Tierney, supra note 154.
157. Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, art. 1, Dec.
26, 1933, 165 L.N.T.S. 19.
158. Reference re Secession of Quebec [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, para. 143 (Can.).
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nario states could still withhold recognition. A state may with-
hold recognition of Scotland, a free and democratic country
bound to the United Kingdom, because a unilateral secession
would violate the principles of self-determination in a constitu-
tional context as understood by that state.159 Further, if Scot-
land failed to negotiate a constitutional process for an independ-
ence referendum and proceeded in spite of that fact, states may
withhold recognition because an independence referendum vio-
lated U.K. law.160
B. The Scotland Referendum Act
The Edinburgh Agreement both conferred the authority to leg-
islate the referendum on Scottish Parliament and required it to
so legislate. 161 Scotland took the referendum requirements
enunciated by the Edinburgh Agreement and implemented leg-
islation in the form of the Scottish Independence Referendum
(Franchise) Act (“Franchise Act”) and the Scottish Independence
ReferendumAct.162 Taken with the Edinburgh Agreement, these
Acts structured the Scottish referendum as a model independ-
ence referendum.
1. Framing the Question of Secession
The Scottish independence referendum asked voters “Should
Scotland be an independent country?”163 The question is a tem-
plate of clarity, in contradistinction, for example, to the vague
questions about sovereignty found in referendums like those in
Quebec.164 The question, as always, was the source of great de-
bate; initially the question read, “Do you agree that Scotland
159. The Prime Minister of Spain has refused to recognize the Catalonian
independence referendum, discussed at greater length below, rejecting at-
tempts to amend the Constitution to permit independence referendums. Bor-
gen, supra note 147.
160. Tierney, supra note 154.
161. Edinburgh Agreement, supra note 139.
162. Scottish Independence Referendum Act 2013, (ASP 14); Scottish Inde-
pendence Referendum (Franchise) Act 2013, (ASP 13) §§ 1–2.
163. Scottish Independence Referendum Act 2013 § 1.
164. Connolly, supra note 102. By Quebec referendum’s standards, “the Scot-
tish referendum question could not be more clear and straightforward.” Id. The
Quebec question perplexingly asked voters, “Do you agree that Quebec should
become sovereign, after having made a formal offer to Canada for a new eco-
nomic and political partnership, within the scope of the Bill Respecting the
Future of Quebec, and of the agreement signed on June 12, 1995?”.
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should be an independent country?”, which was perceived as po-
tentially prejudicial phrasing.165
Yet the clear question that would appear on the referendum
ballot ultimately emerged from the Edinburgh Agreement,
which required that the referendum question be an unequivocal
vote on separation from the United Kingdom.166 Though Scot-
land could have attempted to negotiate a referendum that posed
the alternative question of devolution,167 the binary question
posed instead comports exactly with the “clear question” require-
ment as explicated by the Clarity Act.168
2. Majority
Scotland established a simple majority requirement to approve
the independence referendum.169 Thus, Scotland engaged with
the “clear majority” requirement of the Secession Reference, ar-
riving at a different conclusion than did Montenegro.170 The in-
dependence referendums in Montenegro and elsewhere required
special majorities, and the propriety of such special majorities
remains debated. 171 Indeed, Scotland wished to foreclose the
possibility of another defeat due to a special majority require-
ment; a 1979 Scottish referendum on devolution that was ap-
proved by a majority of voters had no effect due to a special turn-
out requirement.172 Scotland’s decision comports with the major-
ity of state practice in this regard, and cannot be said to conflict
with international norms.173
165. Tierney, supra note 21, at 365.
166. Edinburgh Agreement, supra note 139.
167. Connolly, supra note 102.
168. Clarity Act, R.S.C. 2000, c. 26 (Can.). The Clarity Act required that ref-
erendum choices envisage no other possibilities than secession. Id. at art. 1(4).
169. SCOTTISH GOV’T, YOUR SCOTLAND, YOUR REFERENDUM 13, para. 1.21
(2012), http://www.gov.scot/Resource/0038/00386122.pdf.
170. Id. at 13, para. 1.22. This whitepaper issued by the Scottish Government
details how the simple majority requirement comports with both U.K. practice
and European state practice. The whitepaper distinguishes the case of Monte-
negro, which had a special majority requirement, from Scotland, noting that
“in 2006 the Venice Commission published a voluntary Code of Good Practice
for Referendums” that rejected both special majority and special turnout re-
quirements. Id.
171. Qvortrup, supra note 28, at 64. Special majority requirements remain
rare and often are employed with obstructionist aims.
172. Id. at 61.
173. Id. at 62.
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3. Enfranchisement
After the Edinburgh Agreement, Scotland quickly passed the
Franchise Act to enable voter registration.174 The independence
referendum was only open to Scottish residents, as was the case
in Montenegro.175 Though voter eligibility in independence ref-
erendums continues to be an issue of great dispute,176 Scotland’s
decision remained largely uncontroversial.177
Yet Scotland’s decision to enfranchise voters aged sixteen and
over, however, was an important departure from British law.178
Further, as the voter qualifications were the same as those for
Scottish Parliament, the election permitted EU and Common-
wealth citizens residing in Scotland to vote in the election.179 In
so doing, Scotland successfully permitted those most directly af-
fected by the independence referendum to vote. Scotland thus
negotiated competing notions of an eligible electorate, balancing
the “consent-autonomy” principle, embracing those who would
consent to a new state, and the “all-affected-interests” principle,
embracing all affected parties, including potentially nonresi-
dents.180
4. Procedure
Scotland legislated important points of procedure in the Refer-
endum Act. The Referendum Act places limitations on funding
and spending that substantially reduce the ability of all special
interest groups, including those outside Scotland, to affect the
referendum outcome. 181 The Act also empowers an Electoral
Commission, tasked in part with attaining the largest possible
174. Tierney, supra note 21, at 363.
175. Oklopcic supra note 12, at 25, 27. In Montenegro’s, the enfranchisement
of nonresident citizens was a contentious issue; the referendum was restricted
to resident citizens. Id.
176. Qvortrup, supra note 28, at 63. In contrast to the 2014 Scottish and 2005
Montenegrin independence referendums, which both excluded nonresidents,
Eritrea and East Timor included nonresidents in 1993 and 1999, respectively.
Id. Qvortrup notes that the existence of a displaced diaspora could potentially
justify this inclusion. Id.
177. Id.
178. Tierney, supra note 21, at 364.
179. Id. at 363–64. By contrast, the Netherlands disallowed resident EU cit-
izens from voting in its 2006 constitutional referendum. Id.
180. Oklopcic, supra note 12, at 34–37.
181. Scottish Independence Referendum Act 2013, (ASP 14), §§ 12–14.
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voter turnout.182 The efforts were a success, with 85 percent of
eligible voters casting their ballots. 183 Scotland thus demon-
strated a free, fair, and motivated referendum.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE SCOTTISH INDEPENDENCE
REFERENDUM FOR THE FUTURE
The Scottish independence referendum establishes critical
precedent for future independence referendums. The example of
the Scottish referendum militates for secessionists to obtain the
consent of the parent state before proceeding with a referendum
on independence. Further, the Scottish referendum requires
subsequent independence referendums to follow the Scottish ex-
ample in requiring a simple majority to approve a clear and un-
ambiguous question. These principles, central to Scotland’s in-
dependence referendum, can ground future independence refer-
endums in international law and provide conclusive determina-
tions of popular support for secession among an electorate.
A. Consent of the Parent State
Scotland’s independence referendum illustrates how funda-
mental the consent of the parent state remains to the political
possibility and legality of independence referendums. Though
Scotland did not attain independence, the governments of Scot-
land and the United Kingdom broadly agreed to determine the
matter of independence by referendum, and from that agree-
ment flowed enacting legislation in the legislatures of both gov-
ernments.184 Ultimately, the referendum was held. If the United
Kingdom had withheld this vital consent, the Scottish referen-
dum would not have been able to proceed on any legal basis.185
182. Id. § 26.
183. Steven Erlanger, A Kingdom Still Whole, But Far From United, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 19, 2014, at A1.
184. The U.K. government enabled the Scottish Parliament to legislate the
matter of the independence referendum, see The Scotland Act 1998 (Modifica-
tion of Schedule 5) Order 2013, SI 2013/242 (UK), and the Scottish government
passed the Scottish Independence Referendum Act 2013, (ASP 14), in compli-
ance with the terms of the Edinburgh Agreement.
185. Crawford’s analysis of the Scottish independence referendum proceeds
on the assumption that the appropriate legal basis for Scotland’s secession is
the consent of the United Kingdom. Crawford, supra note 22, at 67, para. 1.
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This conclusion is borne out by the case of Catalonia, an au-
tonomous region of Spain. The Catalans, like the Scots, had ob-
tained devolved powers from the government of Spain.186 In-
deed, the powers of the Catalan government exceed that of Scot-
land, as Catalonia has the powers to control domestic benefit
spending as well as dictate certain domestic policies pertaining
to taxation, justice, policing, health, and education.187
However, Catalonia’s devolved powers conferred no advantage
that could overcome the lack of consent to an independence ref-
erendum from Spain. Catalonia had long sought independence
from Spain, and in 2014 Catalan nationalists attempted to leg-
islate an independence referendum, which the Spanish legisla-
ture rejected.188 The central government refused to entertain
further discussion, and the matter came to a head when seces-
sionists defiantly vowed to hold the referendum.189 The High
Court of Spain adjudicated the issue, found no legal basis for the
referendum, and agreed with the Prime Minister that it was an
illegal political maneuver.190 Yet the secessionists pressed on,
holding a nonbinding referendum staffed by volunteers. 191
Though less than half of the electorate participated in the vote,
80 percent of those voting approved independence.192 National-
ists were dealt another blow in December 2015, when, after at-
taining a majority of seats in the Catalan legislature and pass-
ing a resolution vowing to proceed with an independence refer-
endum, the Constitutional Court of Spain ruled the resolution
unconstitutional.193
186. George Arnett, How do Scotland’s Tax and Spending Powers Compare
with Catalonia?, GUARDIAN (Dec. 5, 2014, 9:55 PM), http://www.theguard-
ian.com/news/datablog/2014/dec/05/how-do-scotlands-tax-and-spending-pow-
ers-compare-with-catalonia.
187. Id.
188. Spain’s Parliament Rejects Catalan Independence Bid, TELEGRAPH (Apr.
9, 2014, 12:58 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/eu-
rope/spain/10753934/Spains-parliament-rejects-Catalan-independence-
bid.html.
189. Raphael Minder, Catalonia Overwhelmingly Votes for Independence
From Spain in Straw Poll, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2014, at A4.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Catalonia to Pursue Split from Spain Despite Court Block, Mas Says,
REUTERS (Dec. 3, 2015, 5:03 PM), http://in.reuters.com/article/spain-catalonia-
idINKBN0TM1A420151203.
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By contrast, the island of New Caledonia is proceeding with
negotiations concerning a referendum on its independence from
France to occur by the end of 2017.194 New Caledonia is engaging
in such negotiations because it executed a 1998 agreement with
France, the Noumea Accord, which required a referendum on in-
dependence to finally and fully resolve whether the electorate of
New Caledonia wished to remain an overseas territory of
France.195 Prime Minister Francoise Hollande, in the first offi-
cial visit by a French Prime Minister to New Caledonia, pledged
to hold the vote by 2017 and implement its results.196 As New
Caledonia has the consent of its parent state, it can determine
the timing of the independence referendum.197
Thus, the Scottish experience establishes the centrality of the
principle of consent to the process of an independence referen-
dum. Indeed, as noted in the Secession Reference, a unilateral
secession pursuant to an independence referendum is only per-
missible in limited circumstances, including colonization or
domination by a foreign power.198 Consequently, unless seces-
sionists are victims of colonization or domination, consent is the
sole basis for holding an independence referendum. If a parent
state withholds such consent, secessionists are unlikely to
achieve secession by independence referendum, or obtain state
recognition. Where such consent is conferred, states may negoti-
ate with the parent state, as did Scotland, pursue independence
referendums with the consent of the parent state, and obtain
state recognition without the opposition of the parent state.
B. Requirement of a Clear and Polar Question
Scotland’s independence referendum question, “Should Scot-
land be an independent country?” was a model of simplicity and
clarity. Such a question invites no alternatives, a critical point
to formulating debate. The question was carefully considered,
194. New Caledonia Referendum a Must, RADIO N.Z. (Nov. 18, 2014, 9:52
AM), http://www.radionz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/259613/new-caledo-
nia-referendum-a-must.
195. Noumea Accord, reprinted in 7 AUSTL. INDIGENOUS L. REP. 88, para. 5
(2002) [hereinafter Noumea Accord], available at http://www.world-
lii.org/au/journals/AILR/2002/17.html.
196. New Caledonia Referendum a Must, supra note 194.
197. Id.
198. Reference re Secession of Quebec [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, 295 (Can.).
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and determined to have no bias implicit in its phrasing.199 Ini-
tially the question read, “Do you agree that Scotland should be
an independent country,” which some thought to be prejudicial
phrasing; the final phrasing was agreed to be a less prejudicial
formulation.200 Each of these qualities directly resolves issues
posed by previous independence referendum questions.
The importance of a clear and polar question is demonstrated
by the experience of Catalonia in its nonbinding referendum. In
its recent referendum, Catalonia failed to follow the model of
Scotland, posing a multipolar question and thus diminishing the
possibilities of achieving independence even further.201 The non-
binding Catalan independence referendum asked voters if they
“want[ed] Catalonia to be a state” and if so, if they “want[ed] that
state to be independent,” and such language deprived the result
of clarity.202 Of those eligible voters casting ballots in the non-
binding Catalonian independence referendum, 10 percent
wished for statehood but not independence, and 5 percent re-
jected statehood and independence.203 The multipolar quality of
the referendum thus reduced the margin of approval substan-
tially and undercut the finality of the referendum by inviting
comparison of three competing options.
Indeed, the U.K. government foresaw this very issue with re-
spect to the Scottish independence referendum when it insisted
on a single question concerning independence only, maintaining
that only a clear vote on the question of Scottish independence
would “put the matter to bed.”204 In this spirit, the Noumea Ac-
cord envisions a simple question embracing only full sovereignty
and independence of New Caledonia.205 Again, the Scottish ex-
ample proves instructive. Unclear, multipolar independence ref-
199. Tierney, supra note 21, at 365.
200. Id. Further, a survey of positive and negative language use in independ-
ence referendum questions indicated that questions’ inflection may not effect
referendum responses. Qvortrup, supra note 28, at 62.
201. Benjamin Fox, Breaking up is Hard to Do, EUOBSERVER (Dec. 29, 2014,
8:24 AM), https://euobserver.com/review-2014/126470.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Katrin Bennhold, On Road to Scotland’s Decision, Gambles and Fateful
Step, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2014, at A12.
205. Noumea Accord, supra note 195, art. 5. The Noumea Accord envisions a
vote on full sovereignty and provides for two subsequent rounds of voting if the
electorate rejects full sovereignty in the first vote.
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erendum questions do not produce final and unambiguous deci-
sions on independence. Instead, clear, polar questions produce
definite and reliable conclusions.
C. Requirement of a Simple Majority
Scotland required only a simple majority and employed no spe-
cial majority requirements whatsoever, including those relating
to voter turnout.206 A simple majority eliminates concerns about
legitimacy and reduces claims by either party of obstruction-
ism.207 In the case of Scotland, a simple majority requirement
was entirely sufficient to resolve the issue of independence.
Scotland extended the vote to all residents aged sixteen and
over, and achieved a remarkable voter turnout.208 Though the
Scottish National Party is already making statements about the
possibility of another referendum,209 the United Kingdom will be
devolving greater ability to legislate Scottish taxation and
spending policies.210 This devolution, coupled with the defeat of
the referendum, led Prime Minister David Cameron to declare
that the issue was “settled for a generation.”211
The requirement of a simple majority enhances the transpar-
ency and legitimacy of an independence referendum, and se-
cures the basis of that referendum in international law. New
Caledonia will enjoy these advantages when it employs a simple
majority requirement in its independence referendum. 212
206. SCOTTISHGOV’T, note 169, at 13, para. 1.21.
207. Qvortrup, supra note 28, at 62.
208. Andy McSmith, Scottish Referendum Results: Huge Turnout Bolsters
Case for Voting at 16, INDEPENDENT (Sept. 19, 2014), http://www.independ-
ent.co.uk/news/uk/scottish-independence/scottish-referendum-results-huge-
turnout-bolsters-case-for-voting-at-16-9745081.html.
209. Salmond Believes He Will Get ‘Second Chance’ at Independence, STV
(Dec. 20, 2014, 11:16 AM), http://news.stv.tv/scotland-decides/news/304227-
salmond-believes-he-will-get-second-chance-at-independence-referendum/.
210. Haroon Siddique, New Powers for Scotland: Key Points from the Smith
Commission, GUARDIAN (Nov. 27, 2014, 6:03 AM), http://www.theguard-
ian.com/politics/2014/nov/27/scottish-devolution-smith-commission-key-
points.
211. Andrew Osborn, Cameron Says Scottish Independence Issue Settled ‘for
a Generation’, REUTERS (Sept. 19, 2014, 9:04 AM), http://uk.reuters.com/arti-
cle/2014/09/19/uk-independence-scotland-cameron-idUK-
KBN0HE0IN20140919.
212. Noumea Accord, supra note 195, art. 5.
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Though debates remain as to the proper electorate to enfran-
chise, the vote is likely to be restricted to residents of New Cal-
edonia.213 Here, as in the case of Scotland, a simple majority of
resident voters will establish a clear referendum result.
CONCLUSION
While the unionists ultimately prevailed on September 19,
2014, the Scottish independence referendum set a true course
for future referendums and indicates an important trajectory in
international law. Applying the principles of consent, clarity and
majority, it was “a landmark political event” affording “a rare
opportunity for a fair, lawful process validated by the assent of
both Governments.”214 The Scottish independence referendum
established new and meaningful political precedent for aspiring
states to democratically secede, from which “a new norm of cus-
tomary international law will begin to emerge.”215 Scotland’s ref-
erendum is thus an example of state practice that may require
examination of “a positive right of secession under international
law.”216
The Scottish referendum is poised to affect the progress of
other contemporary independence movements as well. Histori-
cally, independence referendums “have come in waves.”217 Cata-
lonians invoked the Scottish example in the nonbinding referen-
213. Kanak Group Boycotts Paris Talks on Noumea Accord, RADION.Z. (Sept.
30, 2014) [hereinafter Kanak Group Boycott] http://www.radionz.co.nz/interna-
tional/programmes/datelinepacific/audio/20151620/kanak-group-boycotts-
paris-talks-on-noumea-accord. The Noumea Accord requires an independence
referendum between 2014 and 2018, but disputes about voter eligibility remain
an obstacle to implementation negotiations.
214. Tierney, supra note 21, at 390.
215. Tom Sparks, The International Legal Significance of the Scottish Inde-
pendence Referendum–A Long View, OPINIO JURIS (Sept. 17, 2014, 8:00 AM),
http://opiniojuris.org/2014/09/17/scottish-independence-insta-symposium-in-
ternational-legal-significance-scottish-independence-referendum-long-view.
216. Milena Sterio, International Law Should Matter–Thoughts on the Pro-
posed Scottish Secession, OPINIO JURIS (Sept. 17, 2014, 10:30 AM), http://opin-
iojuris.org/2014/09/17/scottish-independence-insta-symposium-international-
law-matter-thoughts-proposed-scottish-secession. Others maintain that Scot-
land’s referendum constitutes no more than persuasive political precedent.
Borgen, supra note 147.
217. Matt Qvortrup, The ‘Neverendum’? A History of Referendums and Inde-
pendence, POL. STUD. ASS’N (June 24, 2013), http://www.psa.ac.uk/print/757.
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dum of November 2014, where supporters of independence con-
ducted a referendum despite the Spanish government’s pledge
to deny the vote any effect.218 It will be tested this year or the
next in New Caledonia, which is in current negotiations to de-
termine the details of an independence referendum.219 National-
ists also hope to test it in Flemish Belgium.220 Even Quebec se-
cessionists, despite their previous failures, regard the Scottish
referendum as establishing powerful new precedent.221 If the
voters in these and future referendums achieve independence,
they will do so based on Scotland’s new framework for demo-
cratic secession.
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